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 ask them whether they think themselves free, and they will immediately answer, Yes; and say some one or other of these foregoing things, and particularly think they prove themselves free when they affirm they can do as they will.

Nay, celebrated philosophers and theologers, both ancient and modern, who have meditated much on this matter, talk after the same manner, giving definitions of Liberty that are consistent with Fate or Necessity; though, at the same time, they would be thought to exempt some of the actions of man from the power of Fate, or to assert Liberty from Necessity. Cicero defines Liberty to be a power to do as we will. And therein several moderns follow him. One defines Liberty to be a power to act, or not to act, as we will. Another defines it in more words thus: “A power to do what we will, and because we will; so that if we did not will it, we should not do it; we should even do the contrary if we willed it.” And another: “A power to do or forbear an action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either is preferred to the other.” On all which definitions, if the reader will be pleased to reflect, he will see them to be only definitions of Liberty or Freedom from outward impediments of action, and not a Freedom or Liberty from Necessity; as I also will show them to be in the sequel of this discourse, wherein I shall contend equally with them for such a power as they describe, though I affirm that there is no Liberty from Necessity.

Alexander the ApbrodisæanAphrodisæan [sic] (a most acute philosopher of the second century, and the earliest commentator now extant upon Aristotle, and esteemed his best defender and interpreter) defines Liberty to be “A power to choose what to do after deliberation and