Page:A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (3rd ed., 1735).djvu/93

 and necessary, it would overflow, tho’ the necessary means to make it overflow did not precede; so it is no less absurd to argue from the fix’d period of human life, against the necessary means to bring it to its fix’d period, or to cause it not to exceed that period.

5. Fifthly, it is ask’d, how a man can act against his conscience, and how a man’s conscience can accuse him if he knows he acts necessarily, and also does what he thinks best when he commits any sin.

I reply, that conscience being a man’s own opinion of his actions with relation to some rule, he may at the time of doing an action contrary to that rule, know that he breaks that rule; and consequently act with reluctance, tho’ not sufficient to hinder the action. But after the action is over, he may not only judge his action to be contrary to that rule; but by the absence of the pleasure of the sin, and by finding himself obnoxious to shame, or believing himself liable to punishment, he may really accuse himself; that is, he may condemn himself for having done it, be sorry he has done it,