Page:A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (3rd ed., 1735).djvu/77

 ry: for it no less implies a contradiction, that causes should not produce their effects (causes and effects having a necessary relation to and dependence on each other) than that an event should not come to pass which is decreed by God.

has some passages to the purpose of this argument. Says he, ''Qui potest provideri quidquam futurum esse quod neque causam habet ullam, neque notam, cur futurum fit?—Quid est igitur, quod casu fieri aut forte fortuna, putemus?—Nihil est enim tam contrarium rationi & constantiæ quam fortuna; ut mihi ne in Deum cadere videatur, ut sciat, quid casu & fortuito futurum fit. Si enim scit, certe illud eveniet. Sin certe eveniet, nulla est fortuna. Est autem fortuna. Rerum igitur fortuitarum nulla est presentio. Also that illustrious reformer says, in his treatise against free-will: Concessa Dei præscientia & omnipotentia, sequitur naturaliter irrefragabili consequentia, nos per nos ipsos non esse factos, nec vivere, nec agere quicquam, sed per illius omnipotentiam. Cum autem tales nos ille ante præscierit futuros, talesque nunc faciat, moveat, & gubernet; quid''