Page:A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (3rd ed., 1735).djvu/75

 just a rule of truth; and what seems evil, as just a rule of good, as what seems good. Which are absurdities too great for any to affirm; especially if we consider, that there is a perfectly wise and good Being, who has given men senses and reason to conduct them.

Lastly, it is a perfection to be necessarily determin’d in our choices, even in the most indifferent things: because, if in such cases there was not a cause of choice, but a choice could be made without a cause; then all choices might be made without a cause, and we should not be necessarily determin’d by the greatest evidence to assent to truth, nor by the strongest inclination for happiness to chuse pleasure and avoid pain; to all which it is a perfection to be necessarily determin’d. For if any action whatsoever can be done without a cause; then effects and causes have no necessary relation, and by consequence we should not be necessarily determin’d in any case at all.

 IV. A fourth argument to prove man a necessary agent, shall be taken from the consideration of the divine prescience.