Page:A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (3rd ed., 1735).djvu/73

 assent by what seems a reason to him, and necessarily determin'd in his several volitions by what seems good to him; than if he was indifferent to propositions notwithstanding any reason for them, or was indifferent to any objects notwithstanding they seem'd good to him? For otherwise, he could be convinced upon no principles, and would be the most undisciplinable and untractable of all Animals. All advice and all reasonings would be of no use to him. You might offer arguments to him, and lay before him pleasure and pain; and he might stand unmov'd like a rock. He might reject what appears true to him, assent to what seems absurd to him, avoid what he sees to be good, and chuse what he sees to be evil. Indifference therefore to receive truth, that is liberty to deny it when we see it; and indifference to pleasure and pain, that is, liberty to refuse the first and chuse the last, are direct obstacles to knowledge and happiness. On the contrary, to be necessarily determin'd by what seems reasonable, and by what seems good, has a direct tendency to promote truth and happiness, and