Page:A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (3rd ed., 1735).djvu/70

 cosequently without any reason or cause: which cannot be conceiv'd possible of any being; and is contrary to this self-evident, truth that whatever has a beginning must have a cause. But if things are not indifferent to him, he must be necessarily determin'd by what is best. Besides, as he is a wise being, he must have some end and design: and as he is a good being, things cannot be indifferent to him, when the happiness of intelligent and sensible beings, depend on the will he has, in the formation of things. With what consistency therefore can those advocates of liberty assert to be a holy and good being, who maintain that all things are indifferent to him before he wills any thing; and that he may will and do all things, which they themselves esteem wick'd and unjust?

I cannot give a better confirmation of this argument from the consideration of the Attributes of, than by the judgment of the late Bishop of ; which has the more weight as proceeding from a great asserter of liberty, who by the force of truth is driven to say what he does. He grants that infinite per-