Page:A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (3rd ed., 1735).djvu/43

 gland before going out of it (in which will he is manifestly determin'd by the satisfaction he has in living in England) he rejects the will to go out of England; so a man who suspends a will about any matter, wills doing nothing in it at present, or rejects for a time willing about it; which circumstances of wholly rejecting, and rejecting for a time, make no variation that affects the question. So that willing, or chusing suspension, is like all other choices or wills we have.

2. Secondly, let us now see, whether we are at liberty to will or chuse one or the other of two or more objects. Now as to this, we will, first, consider, whether we are at liberty to will one of two or more objects wherein we discern any difference: that is, where one upon the whole seems less hurtful than another. And this will not admit of much dispute, if we consider what willing is. Willing or preferring, is the same with respect to good and evil, that judging is with respect to truth or falshood. It is judging, that one thing is upon the whole better than another, or not so bad as another. Wherefore, as we judge of truth or falshood according to appearances, so we