Page:A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (3rd ed., 1735).djvu/41

 beginning or forbearance, the continuance or ending of any action, is call'd the will, and the actual exercise thereof, willing.

There are two questions usually put about this matter: first, Whether we are at liberty to will, or not to will? secondly, Whether we are at liberty to will one or the other of two or more objects?

1. As to the first, whether we are at liberty to will or not to will? it is manifest, we have not that liberty. For let an action in a man's power be propos'd to him as presently to be done, as for example, to walk; the will to walk, or not to walk, exists immediately. And when an action in a man's power is propos'd to him to be done to morrow, as to walk to morrow; he is no less oblig'd to have some immediate will. He must either have a will to defer willing about the matter propos'd, or he must will immediately in relation to the thing propos'd: and one or the other of those wills must exist immediately, no less than the will to walk, or not to walk in the former case. Wherefore, in every proposal of something to be done which is in man's