Page:A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (3rd ed., 1735).djvu/36

 to flow from the doctrine of Necessity, combating what they allow to be matter of seeming experience; Others, and those the most discerning, either think liberty cannot be prov’d by experience, or think Men may see by experience, that they are necessary Agents; and the bulk of Mankind have always been persuaded that they are necessary Agents.

Having thus pav’d the way by shewing that liberty is not a plain matter of experience, by arguments drawn from the asserters of liberty themselves, and by consequence subverted the argument from experience for liberty; we will now run over the various actions of Men which can be conceiv’d to concern this subject, and examine, whether we can know from experience, that Man is a free or a necessary Agent. I think those actions may be reduc’d to these four: 1. Perception of Ideas. 2. Judging of Propositions. 3. Willing. 4. Doing as we will.

1. Perception of Ideas. Of this there can be no dispute but it is a necessary action of man, since it is not even a voluntary action. The Ideas both of sensation and reflection, offer themselves to