Page:A Memoir of the Last Year of the War for Independence in the Confederate States of America.djvu/96

  look after the raiders and drive them to their homes." And further on in the same letter he says: "Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south, and to do this, you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your courses he takes." When Sheridan relived Hunter, this letter of instructions was ordered to be turned over to him, and two divisions of cavalry subsequently joined him; yet grant says in regard to Sheridan's operations: "His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement took place. The two armies lay in such a position, the enemy on the west bank of the Opequon creek covering Winchester, and out forces in front of Berryville, that either could bring on a battle at any time. Defeat to us would open to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be interposed to check him. Under these circumstances, I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. Finally the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of reliving Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion so great, that I determined the risk should be taken. But fearing to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did of General Sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, I left City Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his headquarters, to decide after conference with him what should be done. I met him at Charlestown, and he pointed out so directly how each army lay, what he would do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of success, that I saw there were but two words of instruction necessary—go in." In the letter to Hunter there is no hesitation about the initiative, and yet, notwithstanding this letter was turned over to Sheridan for his guidance, and two divisions of cavalry subsequently sent to him, and the further fact that he had been operating both on the offensive and defensive during August and the fore part of September, the impression is sought to be made that his ardor was restrained by some sort of orders, of which no mention is made in Grant's report. Really this is very curious, and Grant's admission of his hesitation in allowing the initiative to be taken, and the statement that the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal were so obstructed, and the invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland so constantly threatened, as to compel him to throw off that hesitation, convey a great compliment to the efficiency of my small force. The railroad is twenty-two miles from Winchester at the nearest point, and the canal over thirty and north of the Potomac, while Sheridan was much nearer to both. That Grant did find it necessary to say to Sheridan, "go in!" I can well believe, but that the latter was panting for the utterance of that classic phrase, I must be allowed to regard as apocryphal. At light on the morning of the 20th, my Troops moved to Fisher's Hill without molestation from the enemy. and again took position at that point on the old line—Wharton's division being on the right, then Gordon's, Ramseur's, and Rodes', in the order in which they are mentioned. Fitz Lee's cavalry, now under Brigadier-General Wickham, was sent up the Luray Valley to a narrow pass at Millford, to try and hold that valley against the enemy's rivalry. General Ramseur was