Page:A History of the Knights of Malta, or the Order of St. John of Jerusalem.djvu/226

200 attempting to oppose any check to the advance of the Christians, but contenting himself with watching warily the general course of events, and studiously concealing all information as to his own movements. The allies having passed the Danube, entered Bulgaria 100,000 strong, of whom one-half were cavalry.

Their first operation was to undertake the siege of Nicopolis, a powerful fortress on the right bank of the Danube, a little below the confluence of the Aiuta and Osma. This place was founded by Trajan, and some remains of his walls are still to be seen. The works occupied a height dominating over that part of the town which lay without the enceinte. It was a very strong post and well fortified, being one of considerable commercial importance. At this time it was commanded by one of Bajazet’s most experienced leaders. The defence was conducted with the utmost skill and bravery, every inch of the ground being warmly contested. The Christians found the advance very slow and their successes unimportant, when taken into consideration with the losses they daily sustained. During all this time their camp was the scene of the most reckless debauchery, and the reins of discipline seem to have been utterly relaxed. No attempts were made to gather information as to what was going on beyond the immediate vicinity of the army, and all were lulled into a state of the most supine and fatal security. Meanwhile Bajazet, having collected his forces, was advancing with the utmost rapidity and the most profound secrecy to the relief of the beleaguered fortress. So admirably were his dispositions carried out that it was not until his army appeared in their front that the negligent and incautious besiegers had the slightest intimation of his proximity. What ensued was a precise counterpart of those scenes so often before enacted upon the soil of Palestine. Headstrong obstinacy and unthinking impetuosity were once more destined to bring about crushing and humiliating defeat.

Sigismond was well acquainted with the practice then universally prevalent amongst Eastern generals of placing in the van of their armies the most worthless of their levies. These were intended to bear the brunt of the first onset, whilst the better and more trustworthy troops were held in reserve for subsequent action, so soon as the vigour of the attack had exhausted itself.