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 x] E kajiva Doctrine 477 Brahma-caitanya. Jlva being the image of Isvara is thus de- pendent on him, but when the limitations of jlva are removed by right knowledge, the jlva is the same Brahman it always was. Those who prefer to conceive the relation as being of the avaccheda type hold that reflection (pratibim ba) is only possible of things which have colour, and therefore jlva is cit limited (avac- chinna) by the antal)karaI)a (mind). ISvara is that which is be- yond it; the diversity of antal)karaI)as accounts for the diyersity of the jivas. I t is easy however to see that these discussions are not of much fruit from the point of view of philosophy in deter- mining or comprehending the relation of Isvara and jlva. In the Vedanta system Ivara has but little importance, for he is but a phenomenal being; he may be better, purer, and much more powerful than we, but yet he is as much phenomenal as any of us. The highest truth is the self, the reality, the Brahman, and both jlva and ISvara are but illusory impositions on it. Some Vedantists hold that there is but one jlva and one body, and that all the world as well as all the jlvas in it are merely his imaginings. These dream jlvas and the dream world will continue so long as that super-jlva continues to undergo his experiences; the world-appearance and all of us imaginary individuals, run our course and salvation is as much imaginary salvation as our world-experience is an imaginary experience of the imaginary jlvas. The cosmic jlva is alone the awakened jlva and all the rest are but his imaginings. This is known as the dtrine of ekajlva (one-soul). The opposite of this doctrine is the theory held by some Vedantists that there are many individuals and the world-appear- ance has no permanent illusion for all people, but each person creates for himself his own illusion, and there is no objective datum which forms the common ground for the illusory percep- tion of all people; just as when ten persons see in the darkness a rope and having the illusion of a snake there, run away, and agree in their individual perceptions that they have all seen the same snake, though each really had his own illusion and there was no snake at all. According to this view the illusory perception of each happens for him subjectively and has no corresponding objective phenomena as its ground. This must be distinguished from the normal Vedanta view which holds that objectively phenomena are also happening, but that these