Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/470

 454 The Sa1ikara School of Vedanta [ CII. Ajiiana established by Perception and Inference. Ajftana defined as the indefinite which is neither positive nor negative is also directly experienced by us in such perceptions as U I do not know, or I do not know myself or anybody else," or "I do not know what you say," or more particularly" I had been sleeping so long happily and did not know anything." Such perceptions point to an object which has no definite characteristics, and which cannot properly be said to be either positive or negative. I t may be objected that the perception "I do not know" is not the perception of the indefinite, the ajftana, but merely the nega- tion of knowledge. To this Vedanta says that had it been the perception of a negation merely, then the negation must have been associated with the specific object to which it applied. A negation must imply the thing negatived; in fact negation generally appears as a substantive with the object of negation as a qualifying character specifying the nature of the negation. But the perception" I do not know or I had no knowledge" does not involve the negation of any particular knowledge of any specific object, but the knowledge of an indefinite objectless ignorance. Such an indefinite ajftana is positive in the sense that it is certainly not negative,but this positive indefinite is not positive in the same sense in which other definite entities are called positive, for it is merely the characterless, passive indefinite showing itself in our experience. If negation meant only a general negation, and if the perception of negation meant in each case the per- ception of a general negation, then even where there is a jug on the ground, one should perceive the negation of the jug on the ground, for the general negation in relation to other things is there. Thus negation of a thing cannot mean the general notion of the negation of all specific things; similarly a general negation with- out any specific object to which it might apply cannot manifest itself to consciousness; the notion of a general negation of know- ledge is thus opposed to any and every knowledge, so that if the latter is present the former cannot be, but the perception "I do not know" can persist, even though many individual objects be known to us. Thus instead of say.ing that the perception of" I do not know" is the perception of a special kind of negation, it is rather better to say that it is the perception of a different category namely the indefinite, the ajnana. It is our common experience