Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/433

 x] Epistel1zology of KUlJziirila 4 1 7 was sometimes the result. J f1ana was a movement and not the result of causal operation as N yaya supposed. N yaya would not also admit any movement on the part of the self, but it would hold that when the self is possessed of certain qualities, such as desire, etc., it becomes an instrument for the accom- plishment of a physical movement. Kumarila accords the same self-validity to knowledge that Prabhakara gives. Later know- ledge by experience is not endowed with any special quality which should decide as to the validity of the knowledge of the previous movement. For what is called saIpvadi or later testimony of experience is but later knowledge and nothing morel. The self is not revealed in the knowledge of external objects, but we can know it by a mental perception of self-consciousness. It is the movement of this self in presence of certain collocating cir- cumstances leading to cognition of things that is called jf1ana 2. Here Kumarila distinguishes knowledge as movement from know- ledge as objective consciousness. Knowledge as movement was beyond sense perception and could only be inferred. Th_e iealistic tendncy .o Vijf1anavada Budhi:m, SaIpkya'l and MlmaIpsawas mamfest 111 Itsattemptatestabhshmgtheumque character of knowledge as being that with which alone we are in. touch. But Vijnanavada denied the external world, and thereby did violence to the testimony of knowledge. SaIpkhya admitted the external world but created a gulf between the content ofknow- ledge and pure intelligence; Prabhakara ignored this difference'1 and was satisfied with the introspective assertion that knowledge was such a unique thing that it revealed with itself, the knower and J the known; Kumarila however admitted a transcendent element of movement as being the cause of our objective consciousness, but regarded this as being separate from self. But the question remained unsolved as to why, in spite of the unique character of knowledge, knowledge could relate itself to the world of objects, how far the world of external objects or of knowledge could be regarded as absolutely true. Hitherto judgments were only re- lative, either referring to one's being prompted to the objective world, to the faithfulness of the representation of objects, the suitability of fulfilling our requirements, or to verification by later 1 See Nyiiyara!1zamiilii, svatal)-pramaQya-nirQaya. . 2 See Nyii)'amaiijarf on PramaQa, Slokaz'iirttika on Pratyaka, and Gaga Bha!!a's Bha!tacilltii1/lai on Pratyaka.