Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/426

 4 1 0 The Sa1ikara School of Vedanta [CH. ideational concept and power that such knowledge has of showing the means which being followed the thing can be got (yena krtena artha!z priipito bhavati). PramaI}a then is the similarity of the knowledge with the object by which it is generated, by which we assure ourselves that this is our knowledge of the object as it is perceived, and are thus led to attain it by practical experience. Yet this later stage is pramal).aphala and not pramaI}a which consists merely in the vision of the thing (devoid of other asso- ciations), and which determines the attitude of the perceiver to- wards the perceived object. The pramal).a therefore only refers to the newly-acquired knowledge (alladhigatlidhigalltr) as this is of use to the perceiver in determining his relations with the ob- jective world. This account of perception leaves out the real epistemological question as to how the knowledge is generated by the external world, or what it is in itsel( It only looks to the correctness or faithfulness of the perception to the object and its value for us in the practical realization of our ends. The question of the relation of the external world with knowledge as determining the latter is regarded as unimportant. first moment (pratyakfabalolpamza N. T., p. '20) but this presentative element divested from the product of the affirmative process of the succeeding moments is not character- less, though we cannot express its character; as soon as we try to express it, names and other ideas consisting of affirmation are associated and these did not form a part of the presentative element. Its own character is said to be its own specific nature (svalakfaa). But what is this specific nature? Dharmakj"rtti's answer on this point is that by specific nature he means those specific characteristics of the object which appear clear when the object is near and hazy when it is at a distance (yas)'iirthasya samlidhiiniisannidhii- niibhyiim jliiinapratibhiisabhedastat svalakfalalll N., p. I and N. T., p. 16). Sense- knowledge thus gives us the specific characteristics of the object, and this has the same form as the object itself; it is the appearance of the "blue" in its specific character in the mind and when this is associated by the affirmative or ideational process, the result is the concept or idea" this is blue" (nilasarztpal!1 pratyakalllanubhityamii1Zal!' nilabodhariipamavasthiipyate ... nilasiiriiPJ'alllasya prallliialll nilavikalpal1arupa,!1 tvasya pramiilaphalalll, N. T. p. '2'2). At the first moment there is the appearance of the blue (nilanirbhiisal!l hi vijiiiillalll, N. T. 19) and this is direct acquaintance (yatkilicit arthasya siikfiitkiirijiiiinalll tatpralJlakfalllucyate, N. T. 7) and this is real (parallliirthasat) and valid. This blue sensation is different from the idea "this is blue" (nilabodha, N. T. '2'2) which is the result of the former (pramal).aphala) through the association of the affirmative process (adhJ'avasiiya) and is regarded as invalid for it contains elements other than what were presented to the sense, and is a vikalpa- pratyaya. In my opinion svalal.'aa therefore means pure sensation of the moment presenting the specific features of the object and with Dharmakirtti this is the only thing which is valid in perception and vikalpapratyaya or pramanaphala is the idea or concept which follows it. But though the latter is a product of the former, yet, being the construction of succeeding moments, it cannot give us the pure stage of the first moment of sensation-presentation (kfalasya priipayitumafakyatviit, N. T. 16). N. T. =N)'ii)'abindu{ikii, N = Nyiiyabindu (Peterson's edition).