Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/425

 x] Dhar1nakirtti's View of Objects of Perception 4°9 object of knowledge (gnihya), and by the fact of the rise of such a percept, at another moment it appears as a thing realizable or attainable in the external world. The special features of the object undefinable in themselves as being what they are in themselves (svalaka?la) are what is actually perceived (pra- tyakaviaya)l. The pramii?laphala (result of perception) is the 1 There is a difference of opinion about the meaning of the word co svalak!?aI).a " of Dharmakirtti between my esteemed friend Professor Stcherbatsky of Petrograd and myself. He maintains that Dharmakirtti held that the content of the presentative element at the moment of perception was almost totally empty. Thus he writes to me, " According to your interpretation svalakal).a means-the object (or idea with Vijiia- naviidin) from which eVerything past and everything future has been eliminated, this I do not deny at all. But I maintain that if everything past and future has been taken away, what remains? The present and the present is a kfata i.e. nothing. ...The reverse of k!iial).a is a k!iial).asarptana or simply sarptana and in every sarptana there is a synthesis ekibhava of moments past and future, produced by the intellect (buddhi = niscaya = kalpana = adhyavasaya). ...There is in the perception of a jug something (a kal).a of sense knowledge) which we must distinguish from the idea of a jug (which is always a sarptana, always vikalpita), and if you take the idea away in a strict unconditional sense, no knowledge remains: kanasya jfianena prapayitumasakyatvat. This is absolutely the Kantian teaching about Synthesis 0/ Apprehension. Accordingly pratyak!iia is a tra1zscendmtal source of knowledge, because practically speaking it gives no knowledge at all. This prallliiza is asatkalpa. Kant says that without the elements of intuition (=sense-knowledge=pratyaka=kalpanapo9-ha) our cognitions would be empty and without the elements of intellect (kalpana= buddhi = synthesis = ekibhava) they would be blind. Empirically both are always combined. This is exactly the theory of Dharmakirtti. He is a Vijiianavadi as I understand, because he maintains the cognizability of ideas (vijiiana) alone, but the reality is an incognizable foundation of our knowledge; he admits, it is bahya, it is artha, it is arthakriyak!iial)a = svalak!iial).a ; that is the reason for which he sometimes is called Sautrantika and this school is some- times called Sautranta-vijiianavada, as opposed to the Vijfianavada of Asvagho!iia and AryasaIiga, which had no elaborate theory of cognition. If the jug as it exists in our representation were the svalak!iial).a and paramiirthasat, what would remain of Vijiiana- vada? But there is the perception of the jug as opposed to the pure idea of a jug (suddha kalpana), an element of reality, the sensational k!iial)a, which i;; communicated to us by sense knowledge. Kant's' thing in itself' is also a k!iial)a and also an element of sense knowledge of pure sense as opposed to pure reason, Dharmakirtti has also fuddhii kalpanti and fuddham pratyak!alll. ...And very interesting is the opposition between pratyaka and anumana, the first moves from k!iial)a to salptana and the second from sarptana to kal)a, that is the reason that although bhranta the anumana is never- theless pramal).a because through it we indirectly also reach k!iial)a, the arthakriyak!iial).a. It is bhranta directly and pramal).a indirectly; pratyaka is pramal)a directly and bhranta (asatkalpa) indirectly...." So far as the passages to which Professor Stcherbatsky refers are concerned, I am in full agreement with him. But I think that he pushes the interpretation too far on Kantian lines. When I perceive co this is blue," the perception consists of two parts, the actual presentative element of sense-knowledge (svalakaa) and the affirmation (nifca)Ia). So far we are in complete agreement. But Professor Stcherbatsky says that this sense-knowledge is a k!iial)a (moment) and is nothing. I also hold that it is a kal)a, but it is nothing only in the sense that it is not the same as the notion involving affirmation such as "this is blue." The affirmative process occurring at the succeeding moments is determined by the presentative element of the