Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/416

 4 00 Mzma1?Zsa P hzlosophy [CII. pears to be endowed with movement etc. Moreover knowledge, feeling, etc. though apparent to the perceiver, are not yet per- ceived by others as other qualities of the body, as colour etc., are perceived by other men. It is a general law of causation that the qualities of the constituent elements (in the cause) impart themselves to the effect, but the earth atoms of which the body is made up do not contain the qualities of knowledge etc., and this also corroborates the inference of a separate entity as the vehicle of knowledge etc. The objection is sometimes raised that if the soul is omnipresent how can it be called an agent or a mover? But Mlmarpsa does not admit that movement means atomic motion, for the princi pIe of movement is the energy which moves the atoms, and this is possessed by the omnipresent soul. It is by the energy imparted by it to the body that the latter moves. So it is that though the soul does not move it is called an agent on account of the fact that it causes the movement of the body. The self must also be understood as being different from the senses, for even when one loses some of the senses he continues to perceive his self all the same as persisting all through. The question now arises, how is self cognized? Prabhakara holds that the self as cognizor is never cognized apart from the cognized object, nor is the object ever cognized without the cog- nizor entering into the cognition as a necessary factor. Both the self and the object shine forth in the self-luminous knowledge in what we have already described as triputI-pratyak!?a (perception as three-together). It is not the soul which is self-illumined but knowledge; so it is knowledge which illumines both the self and the object in one operation. But just as in the case of a man who walks, the action of walking rests upon the walker, yet he is regarded as the agent of the work and not as the object, so in the case of the operation of knowledge, though it affects the self, yet it appears as the agent and not as the object. Cognition is not soul, but the soul is manifested in cognition as its substratum, and appears in it as the cognitive element" I" which is inseparable from all cognitions. In deep sleep therefore when no object is cognized the self also is not cognized. Kumarila however thinks that the soul which is distinct from the body is perceived by a mental perception (1Ilii1lasa-pratyaka) as the substratum of the notion of" I," or in other words the self perceives itself by mental perception, and the perception of its