Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/405

 IX] Inference 3 8 9 absence of the gamaka or vyapya, should also be noted, for a knowledge of such a negative relation is not indispensable for the forming of the notion of the permanent relation 1. The ex- perience of a large number of particular cases in which any two things were found to coexist together in another thing in some relation associated with the non-perception of any case of failure creates an expectancy in us of inferring the presence of the gamya in that thing in which the gamaka is perceived to exist in exactly the same relation 2. In those cases where the circle of the existence of the gamya coincides with the circle of the exist- ence of the gamaka, each of them becomes a gamaka for the other. I t is clear that this form of inference not only includes all cases of cause and effect, of genus and species but also all cases of coexistence as well. The question arises that if no inference is possible without a memory of the permanent relation, is not the self-validity of inference destroyed on that account, for memory is not re- garded as self-valid. To this Kumarila's answer is that memory is not invalid, but it has not the status of pramal)a, as it does not bring to us a new knowledge. But inference involves the acquirement of a new knowledge in this, that though the coex- istence of two things in another was known in a number of cases, yet in the present case a new case of the existence of the gamya in a thing is known from the perception of the existence of the gamaka and this knowledge is gained by a means which is not perception, for it is only the gamaka that is seen and not the gamya. If the gamya is also seen it is no inference at all. As regards the number of propositions necessary for the ex- plicit statement of the process of inference for convincing others (piiriirtluinmniina) both Kumarila and Prabhakara hold that three premisses are quite sufficient for inference. Thus the first three premisses pratijfia, hetu and dr!?tanta may quite serve the purpose of an anumana. There are two kinds of anumana according to Kumarila viz. pratyak!?atodrtasambandha and samanyatodr!?tasambandha. The former is that kind of inference where the permanent 1 Kumarila strongly opposes a Buddhist view that concomitance (vyJpti) is ascer- tained only by the negative instances and not by the positive ones. 2 "tasmiidanavagate'pi sarvatrii1Zvaye sarvatafca <yatireke bahllfa1f siihityiivagama- miitriideva vyabhiciiriidarfanasaniithlldanllmii1Zotpattirailgikartavyalf." Nyiiyaratnii- kara, p. 288.