Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/399

 IX] Self-revealing Character of Knowledge 3 8 3 of the pramaQas as pratyaka (perception), anumana (inference), etc. is from the point of view of the objects of knowledge with reference to the varying modes in which they are brought within the purview of knowledge. The self itself however has no illumining or revealing powers, for then even in deep sleep we could have knowledge, for the self is present even then, as is proved by the remembrance of dreams. It is knowledge (sa1?zvid) that reveals by its very appearance both the self, the knower, and the objects. I t is generally argued against the self-illuminative character of knowledge that all cognitions are of the forms of the objects they are said to reveal; and if they have the same form we may rather say that they have the same identical reality too. The Mlmarpsa answer to these objections is this, that if the cognition and the cognized were not different from one another, they could not have been felt as such, and we could not have felt that it is by cognition that we apprehend the cognized objects. The cognition (sa 1!Z vedana) of a person simply means that such a special kind of quality (dharma) has been manifested in the self by virtue of which his active operation with reference to a certain object is favoured or determined, and the object of cog- nition is that with reference to which the active operation of the self has been induced. Cognitions are not indeed absolutely form- less, for they have the cognitional character by which things are illumined and manifested. Cognition has no other character than this, that it illumines and reveals objects. The things only are believed to have forms and only such forms as knowledge reveal to us about them. Even the dream cognition is with reference to objects that were perceived previously, and of which the im- pressions were left in the mind and were aroused by the unseen agency (adr!a). Dream cognition is thus only a kind of remembrance of that which was previously experienced. Only such of the impressions of cognized objects are roused in dreams as can beget just that amount of pleasurable or painful experience, in accordance with the operation of adr!a, as the person deserves to have in accordance with his previous merit or demerit. The Prabhakara Mlmarpsa, in refuting the arguments of those who hold that our cognitions of objects are themselves cognized by some other cognition, says that this is not possible, since we do not experience any such double cognition and also because it would lead us to a regrcsslts ad il1jinitum, for if a second cognition