Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/398

 3 82 Mimii1!zsii Ph£losophy [CH. pasattii. Thus the N yaya view of perception as taking only the thing in its pure being apart from qualities, etc. (sanmiitra-viayam pratyaka1!l) is made untenable by Prabhakara, as according to him the thing is perceived direct with all its qualities. According to Kumarila however jati is not something different from the individuals comprehended by it and it is directly perceived. Kumarila's view of jati is thus similar to that held by Saf!1khya, namely that when we look at an individual from one point of view (jati as identical with the individual), it is the individual that lays its stress upon our consciousness and the notion of jati be- comes latent, but when we look at it from another point of view (the individual as identical with jati) it is the jati which presents itselfto consciousness, and the aspect as individual becomes latent. The apprehension as jati or as individual is thus only a matter of different points of view or angles of vision from which we look at a thing. Quite in harmony with the conception of jati, Kumarila holds that the relation of inherence is not anything which is dis- tinct from the things themselves in which it is supposed to exist, but only a particular aspect or phase of the things themselves (Slokaviirttika, Pratyakasittra, 149, 150, abhediit samaviiyo'stu svariiPam dharmadhar1JlilO!l), Kumarila agrees with Prabhakara that jati is perceived by the senses (tatraikabuddhinirgriilzyii jiitirindriyagocarii). I t is not out of place to mention that on the evidence of Prabhakara we find that the category of visea admitted by the Kal}ada school is not accepted as a separate category by the lIImaf!1sa on the ground that the differentiation of eternal things from one another, for which the category of visea is admitted, may very well be effected on the basis of the ordinary qualities of these things. The quality of prthaktva or specific differences in atoms, as inferred by the difference of things they constitute, can very well serve the purposes of visea. The nature of knowledge. All knowledge involves the knower, the known object, and the knowledge at the same identical moment. All knowledge whether perceptual, inferential or of any other kind must necessarily reveal the self or the knower directly. Thus as in all knowledge the self is directly and immediately perceived, all knowledge may be re- ganled as perception from the point of view of self. The division