Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/374

 35 8 The Nyiiya- Va£seika Philosophy [CH. the negation of the jug existed before and opposed the jug, for how can the negation of the jug oppose the jug, without effecting anything at all? Again, it may be asked whether nega- tion is to be regarded as a positive being or becoming or of the nature of not becoming or non-being. In the first alternative it will be like any other positive existents, and in the second case it will be permanent and eternal, and it cannot be related to this or that particular negation. There are however many kinds of non- perception, e.g. (I) svabhavanupalabdhi (natural non-perception- there is no jug because none is perceived); (2) karat)anupalabdhi (non-perception of cause-there is no smoke here, since there is no fire); (3) vyapakanupalabdhi (non-perception of the species- there is no pine here, since there is no tree); (4) karyanupalabdhi (non-perception of effects-there are not the causes of smoke here, since there is no smoke); (5) svabhavaviruddhopalabdhi (percep- tion of contradictory natures-there is no cold touch here because of fire); (6) viruddhakaryopalabdhi (perception of contradictory effects-there is no cold touch here because of smoke); (7) virud- dhavyaptopalabdhi (opposite concomitance-past is not of neces- sity destructible, since it depends on other causes); (8) karyya vi- ruddhopalabdhi (opposition of effects-there is not here the causes which can give cold since there is fire); (9) vyapakaviruddhopa- labdhi (opposite concomitants-there is no touch of snow here, because of fire); (10) kararya viruddhopalabdhi (opposite causes- there is no shivering through cold here, since he is near the fire); (I I) kararyaviruddhakaryyopalabdhi (effects of opposite causes- this place is not occupied by men of shivering sensations for it is full of smoke l ). There is no doubt that in the above ways we speak of nega- tion, but that does not prove that there is any reason for the cognition of negation (heturlliibhavasamvida!l). All that we can say is this that there are certain situations which justify the use (yogyatti) of negative appellations. But this situation or yogyata is positive in character. What we all speak of in ordinary usage as non-perception is of the nature of perception of some sort. Perception of negation th us does not prove the existence of negation, but only shows that there are certain positive percep- tions which are only interpreted in that way. It is the positive perception of the ground where the visible jug is absent that 1 See NYll)'llbilldu, p. I I, and N)'iiyalllaiijari, pp. 53-7.