Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/367

 VIII] Doctrine of Conco?1zitauce 35 1 (m'darsanabhasa). Prasastapada's contribution thus seems to con- sist of the enumeration of the five premisses and the fallacy of the nidarsana, but the names of the last two premisses are so different from what are current in other systems that it is reason- able to suppose that he collected them from some other traditional Vaise!?ika work which is now lost to us. It however definitely indicates that the study of the problem of inference was being pursued in Vaise!?ika circles independently of N yaya. There is no reason however to suppose that Prasastapada borrowed any- thing from Diimaga as Professor Stcherbatsky or Keith supposes, for, as I have shown above, most of Prasastapada's apparent in- novations are all definitely alluded to by KaI)ada himself, and Professor Keith has not discussed this alternative. On the question of the fallacies of nidarsana, unless it is definitely proved that Diimaga preceded Prasastapada, there is no reason whatever to suppose that the latter borrowed it from the former I. The nature and ascertainment of concomitance is the most important part of inference. Vatsyayana says that an inference can be made by the sight of the liilga (reason or middle) through the memory of the connection between the middle and the major previously perceived. Udyotakara raises the question whether it is the present perception of the middle or the memory of the connection of the middle with the major that should be regarded as leading to inference. His answer is that both these lead to inference, but that which immediately leads to inference is liliga- paralllarsa, i.e. the present perception of the middle in the minor associated with the memory of its connection with the major, for inference does not immediately follow the memory of the con- nection, but the present perception of the middle associated with the memory of the connection (sm.rtyallllg.rhito liligaparamarso). But he is silent with regard to the nature of concomitance. U dyotakara's criticisms of Dirinaga as shown by Vacaspati have no reference to this point. The doctrine of tadat11lya and tadut- patti was therefore in all probability a new contribution to Buddhist logic by Dharmakirtti. Dharmakirtti's contention was that the root principle of the connection between the middle and the major was that the former was either identical in essence with the latter or its effect and that unless this was grasped a mere collection of positive or negative instances will not give us I Prasastapada's bhaya with Nyiiyakandali, pp. 200- 2 55.