Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/366

 35° The Nyiiya - Vaiseika Philosophy [CH. mass of flesh at the neck of an animal infer that it is a cow. But when on the strength of a common quality the inference is ex- tended to a different class of objects, it is called samanyato dr!?ta. Thus on perceiving that the work of the peasants is rewarded with a good harvest I may infer that the work of the priests, namely the performance of sacrifices, will also be rewarded with the objects for which they are performed (i.e. the attainment of heaven). When the conclusion to which one has arrived (svalli- scitiirtha) is expressed in five premisses for convincing others who are either in doubt, or in error or are simply ignorant, then the inference is called pararthanumana. We know that the distinc- tion of svarthanumana (inference for oneself) and pararthanumana (inference for others) was made by the J ains and Buddhists. Prasastapada does not make a sharp distinction of two classes of inference, but he seems to mean that what one infers, it can be conveyed to others by means of five premisses in which case it is called pararthanumana. But this need not be considered as an entirely new innovation of Prasastapada, for in IX. 2, KaQada himself definitely alludes to this distinction (asyeda1!1 kiir)ryakiira- "!lasambandhasciivayaviidbhavati). The five premisses which are called in N yaya pratiJilii, hetu dr!iillta, upanaya, and nigammza are called in V aiseika pratiji/ii, apadesa, nidarsana, a1Zllsandhiina, and pratyiimmiya. KaQada however does not mention the name of any of these premisses excepting the second "apadesa." Pratijfta is of course the same as we have in Nyaya, and the term nidarsana is very similar to N yaya drtanta, but the last two are entirely different. Nidarsana may be of two kinds,(I) agreement in presence (e.g. that which has motion is a substance as is seen in the case of an arrow), (2) agreement in absence (e.g. what is not a substance has no motion as is seen in the case of the universal being 1). He also points out cases of the fallacy of the example 1 Dr Vidyiibhii!iiaI)a says that "An example before the time of Dignaga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to help the understanding of the listener, e.g. The hill is fiery; because it has smoke; like a kitchen (example). Asanga made the ex- ample more serviceable to reasoning, but Dignaga converted it into a universal proposition, that is a proposition expressive of the universal or inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term, e.g. The hill is fiery; because it has smoke; all that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen" (IJldia11 LOlric, pp. 95, 96). It is of course true that Vatsyayana had an imperfect example as " like a kitchen" (fabda!z tltjJtlttidharmakatvadmlilyalf stharyiidivat, I. i. 36), but Prasastapiida has it in the proper form. Whether Prasastapada borrowed it from Diimaga or Dii1l1aga from I'raSastapada cannot be easily settled.