Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/365

 VIII] PrasastaPiida's Interpretation 0/ I1ifel'ence 349 where it does not exist. This is indeed the same as the N yay a qualifications of pakasattva, sapakasatt7)a and vipakiisattva of a valid reason (hetu). Prasastapada further quotes a verse to say that this is the same as what Kasyapa (believed to be the family name of Karyada) said. Karyada says that we can infer a cause from the effect, the effect from the cause, or we can infer one thing by another when they are mutually connected, or in op- position or in a relation of inherence (IX. ii. I and III. i. 9). Ve can infer by a reason because it is duly associated (prllsiddhipii.r- vakatva) with the object of inference. What this association was according to Kal)ada can also be understood for he tells us (III. i. 15) that where there is no proper association, the reason (hetu) is either non-existent in the object to be inferred or it has no concomitance with it (aprasiddha) or it has a doubtful existence (sa1zdigdha). Thus if I say this ass is a horse because it has horns it is fallacious, for neither the horse nor the ass has horns. Again if I say it is a cow because it has horns, it is fallacious, for there is no concomitance between horns and a cow, and though a cow may have a horn, all that have horns are not cows. The first fallacy is a combination of pak!?asattva and sapakasattva, for not only the present pak!?a (the ass) had no horns, but no horses had any horns, and the second is a case of vipakasattva, for those which are not cows (e.g. buffaloes) have also horns. Thus, it seems that when Prasastapada says that he is giving us the view of Karyada he is faithful to it. Prasastapada says that wherever there is smoke there is fire, if there is no fire there is no smoke. When one knows this concomitance and unerringly perceives the smoke, he remembers the concomitance and feels certain that there is fire. But with regard to Karyada's enumeration of types of inference such as " a cause is inferred from its effect, or an effect from the cause," etc., Prasastapada holds that these are not the only types of inference, but are only some examples for showing the general nature of inference. Inference merely shows a connec- tion such that from this that can be inferred. He then divides inference into two classes, dfta (from the experienced charac- teristics of one member of a class to another member of the same class), and samanyato df!:'ta. Dfta (perceived resemblance) is that where the previously known case and the inferred case is exactly of the same class. Thus as an example of it we can point out that by perceiving that only a cow has a hanging mass of flesh on its neck (sasna), I can whenever I see the same hanging