Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/360

 344 The Nyilya- Vazse£ka Philosophy [CH. and in all other known objects similar to the paka in having the sadhya in it (sapaka-satta), i.e., which are known to possess the sadhya (possessing fire in the present example). The lii1ga must not be present in any such object as does not possess the sadhya (vipaka-vyiivrtti absent from vipaka or that which does not possess the sadhya). The inferred assertion should not be such that it is invalidated by direct perception (pratyaka) or the testimony of the sastra (abadltita-viayatva). The lii1ga should not be such that by it an inference in the opposite way could also be possible (asat-pratipaka). The violation of any one of these conditions would spoil the certitude of the hetu as determining the inference, and thus would only make the hetu fallacious, or what is technically called hetvabhasa or seeming hetu by which no correct inference could be made. Thus the inference that sound is eternal because it is visible is fallacious, for visibility is a quality which sound (here the paka) does not possess 1. This hetvabhasa is technically called asiddha-hetu. Again, hetvabhasa of the second type, technically called vintddha-Iletu, may be exemplified in the case that sound is eternal, since it is created; the hetu "being created" is present in the opposite of sadhya (vipaka), namely non-eternality, for we know that non-eternality is a quality which belongs to all created things. A fallacy of the third type, technically called al/aika1ltika-hetu, is found in the case that sound is eternal, since it is an object of knowledge. Now" being an object of knowledge ,. (prameyatva) is here the hetu, but it is present in things eternal (i.e. things possessing sadhya), as well as in things that are not eternal (i.e. which do not possess the sadhya), and therefore 'the concomitance of the hetu with the sadhya is not absolute (allaikiilltika). A fallacy of the fourth type, technically called kii.!tltyayiipadzHa, may be found in the example-fire is not hot, since it is created like a jug, etc. Here pratyaka shows that fire is hot, and hence the hetu is fallacious. The fifth fallacy, called prakara1Jasa1lla, is to be found in cases where opposite hetus are available at the same time for opposite conclusions, e.g. sound like a jug is non- 1 It should be borne in mind that Nyiiya did not believe in the doctrine of the eternality of sound, which the Mimal11sii did. Eternality of sound meant with Mimiilpsii the theory that sounds existed as eternal indestructihle entities, and they were only manifested in our ears under certain conditions, e.g. the stroke of a drum or a part!cular kind of movement of the vocal muscles.