Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/352

 33 6 The Nyiiya- Vaifeika Philosophy [CH. movement which is within the purview of sense-cognition 1. The production of knowledge is thus no transcendental occur- rence, but is one which is similar to the effects produced by the conglomeration and movements of physical causes. When I perceive an orange, my visual or the tactual sense is in touch not only with its specific colour, or hardness, but also with the universals associated with them in a relation of inherence and also with the object itself of which the colour etc. are predicated. The result of this sense-contact at the first stage is called tilocana- ji/ana (sense-cognition) and as a result of that there is roused the memory of its previous taste and a sense of pleasurable character (sukhasadlzanatvasmrti) and as a result of that I perceive the orange before me to have a certain pleasure-giving character 2. I t is urged that this appreciation of the orange as a pleasurable object should also be regarded as a direct result of perception through the action of the memory operating as a concomitant cause (sahakari). I perceive the orange with the eye and under- stand the pleasure it will give, by the mind, and thereupon understand by the mind that it is a pleasurable object. So though this perception results immediately by the operation of the mind, yet since it could only happen in association with sense-contact, it must be considered as a subsidiary effect of sense-contact and hence regarded as visual perception. Whatever may be the succes- sive intermediary processes, if the knowledge is a result of sense- contact and if it appertains to the object with which the sense is in contact, we should regard it as a result of the perceptual pro- cess. Sense-contact with the object is thus the primary and indis- pensable condition of all perceptions and not only can the senses be in contact with the objects, their qualities, and the universals associated with them but also with negation. A perception is erroneous when it presents an object in a character which it does not possess (atasmi1!lstaditz) and right knowledge (prama) is that which presents an object with a character which it really has Na khalvatindriyii faktirasmiibhirupagamyate yayii saha na kiiryyasya sa11lbandhajiiiinasa11lbhava!z. Nyiiya11laiijari, p. 69. Sukhiidi manasii buddhvii kaPitthiidi ca cak!u!ii /asya karazatii tatra 11lanasaiviivaga11lyate... .. .Sa/llbandhagrahazakii Ie yattatkapitthiidiviayamak!ajam jfiiinam tadllPiideyiidijl1dnaphala11liti bhii)'akrtafatasi s/hitam suk hastidh anatvajl1iillam uPiideyajliiinam. Nyiiyamaiijari, pp. 6<)-70; see also pp. 66-j I.