Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/336

 3 20 The Nyiiya- Vaife!ika Philosophy [CH. they admitted dravya, gurya, karma and samanya. Visea they had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did not admit that things were continually changing their qualities, and that everything could be produced out of everything by a change of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms. In the production of the effect too they did not admit that the effect was potentially pre-existent in the cause. They held that the material cause (e.g. clay) had some power within it, and the accessory and other instrumental causes (such as the stick, the wheel etc.) had other powers; the collocation of these two de- stroyed the cause, and produced the effect which was not existent before but was newly produced. This is what is called the doctrine of asatktiryaviida. This is just the opposite of the Sarpkhya axiom, that what is existent cannot be destroyed (nti- bhtivo vidyate sata!l) and that the non-existent could never be produced (niisato vidyate bhiiva!t). The objection to this view is that if what is non-existent is produced, then even such im- possible things as the hare's horn could also be produced. The Nyaya-Vaiseika answer is that the view is not that anything that is non-existent can be produced, but that which is produced was non-existent!. I t is held by Mimarpsa that an unseen power resides in the cause which produces the effect. To this Nyaya objects that this is neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis, for there is no reason to suppose that there is any transcendental operation in causal movement as this can be satisfactorily ex- plained by molecular movement (Paris panda). There is nothing except the invariable time relation (antecedence and sequence) between the cause and the effect, but the mere invariableness of an antecedent does not suffice "0 make it the cause of what succeeds; it must be an unconditional antecedent as well (anya- tlzasiddhisitnyasya niyattipztrvavarttitti). Unconditionality and in- variability are indispensable for kiiryakiira1;za-bhtiva or cause and effect relation. For example, the non-essential or adventitious accompaniments of an invariable antecedent may also be invari- able antecedents; but they are not unconditional, only collateral or indirect. In other words their antecedence is conditional upon something else (1la sviitalltryeza). The potter's stick is an unconditional invariable antecedent of the jar; but the colour I lyiiyamaiijari, p. 49-1-'