Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/335

 VIII] Category of Inherence 3 1 9 is on account of its presence that atoms appear as different to the yogins who can perceive them. Samaviiya, the inseparable relation of inherence, is a relation by virtue of which two different things such as substance and attribute, substance and karma, substance and samanya, karaI)a (cause) and karya (effect), atoms and visea, appear so unified that they represent one whole, or one identical inseparable reality. This peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause why substance, action, and attribute, cause and effect, and jati in sub- stance and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they are one and the same thing. Sarpyoga or contact may take place between two things of the same nature which exist as disconnected and may later on be connected (yutasiddha), such as when I put my pen on the table. The pen and the table are both substances and were disconnected; the sarpyoga relation is the gU1).a by virtue of which they appear to be connected for a while. Sarna vaya however makes absolutely different things such as dravya and gUI)a and karma or karaI)a and karya (clay and jug) appear as one inseparable whole (ayutasiddha). This relation is thus a separate and independent category. This is not regarded as many like sarpyogas (contact) but as one and eternal because it has no cause. This or that object (e.g. jug) may be destroyed but the samavaya relation which was never brought into being by anybody always remains l. These six things are called the six padarthas or independen t realities experienced in perception and expressed in language. The Theory of Causation. The N yaya- V aiseika in most of its speculations took that view of things which finds expression in our language, and which we tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus 1 The Veoiinta does not admit the existence of the relation of samaviiya as sub- sisting between two different entities (e.g. substance and qualities). Thus Sallkara says (Brahnza-sutrabhiiV'a JJ. ii. 13) that if a samaviiya relation is to be admitted to connect two different things, then another samaviiya would be necessary to connect it with either of the two entities that it intended to connect, and that another, and so there will be a vicious infinite (anavasthd). Nyaya, however, would not re- gard it as vicious at all. It is well to rememLer that the Indian systems acknow- ledge two kinds of anavasthii-priinziiliki (valid infinite, as in case of the question of th<; seed and the tree, or of the avidyii and the passions), and another apni1Jliiziki a1Zavasthii (vicious infinite) as when the admission of anything involves an infinite chain before it can be completed.