Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/327

 VIII ] Metaphysz"cal Categorz"es 3 IJ endless futurity before us. Had there been no time we could have no knowledge of it and there would be nothing to account for our time-notions associated with all changes. The Sarpkhya did not admit the existence of any real time; to them the unit of kala is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its own unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atoms and their movements. The appearance of kala as a separate entity is a creation of our buddhi (buddllillirl1Uila) as it represents the order or mode in which the buddhi records its perceptions. But kala in N yaya- V aiseika is regarded as a substance existing by itsel[ In accordance with the changes of things it reveals itself as past, present, and future. Sarpkhya regarded it as past, present, and future, as being the modes of the constitution of the things in its different manifesting stages of evolution (adkllan). The astronomers regarded it as being due to the motion of the planets. These must all be contrasted with the Nyaya-Vaiseika con- ception of kala which is regarded as an all-pervading, partless substance which appears as many in association with the changes related to iP. The seventh substance is relative space (dik). It is that sub- stance by virtue of which things are perceived as being on the right, left, east, west, upwards and downwards; kala like dik is also one. But yet tradition has given us varieties of it in the eight directions and in the upper and lower 2. The eighth substance is the soul (a/man) which is all-pervading. There are separate atmans for each person; the qualities of knowledge, feelings of pleasure and pain, desire, etc. belong to a/man. Manas (mind) is the ninth substance. It is atomic in size and the vehicle of memory; all affec- tions of the soul such as knowing, feeling, and willing, are generated by the connection of manas with soul, the senses and the objects. I t is the intermediate link which connects the soul with the senses, and thereby produces the affections of knowledge, feeling, or willing. Vith each single connection of soul with manas we have a separate affection of the soul, and thus our intellectual experience is conducted in a series, one coming after another and not simul- taneously. Over and above all these we have Isvara. The definition 1 See Nyiiyakandali, pp. 64-66, and Nyiiya11laii/ari, pp. 136-139' The Vaife#ka szttras regarded time as the cause of things which suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal. 2 See Nyiiyakalldali, pp. 66-69, and Nyiiyamailjari, p. 14 0.