Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/320

 3 0 4 The Nyaya-Vaiseika Philosophy [CH. but the technical vyapti is not known, and the connotation of the term prasiddhipltrvakatva of V aiseika seems to be more loose than the term vyapti as we know it in the later Nyaya. The Vaisefika siUras do not count scriptures (Sabda) as a separate pramat:1a, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas. With Nytiya slttras sabda as a pramat:1a applies not only to the Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and Vatsyayana says that trustworthy persons may be of three kinds .rfi, arya and 1Illeccha (foreigners). Upamana which is regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyaya is not even referred to in the Vaisefika siUras. The Nyiiya slttras know of other pramat:1as, such as arthiiPatti, sambhava and aiti'hya, but include them within the pramat:1as admitted by them, but the Vaisefika siUras do not seem to know them at alII. The Vaise- fika slttras believe in the perception of negation (abhava) through the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i. 1-10). The Nyaya siUras (II. ii. 1,2,7-12) consider that abhava as non-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another to "bring the clothes which are not marked," he finds that marks are absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued that absence or non-existence can be directly perceived 2. Though there is thus an agreement between the Nyaya and the Vaisefika siltrtls about the acceptance of abhava as being due to perception, yet their method of handling the matter is different. The Nyiiya siUras say nothing about the categories of dravya, glt1Ja, karma, visefa and samaviiya which form the main subjects of Vaiseka discussions 3. The Nyaya siltras take much pains to prove the materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have been important with V aiseika. The slight reference to this question in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient. The Vaisefika siUras do not mention the name of" Isvara," whereas the Nyaya siltras try to prove his existence on eschatological grounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of self in the Nyaya slttras are mainly on the ground of the unity of sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the 1 The only old authority which knows these pramal).as is Caraka. But he also gives an interprctation of sambhava which is different from Nyiiya and calls arthiipatti arthapriiPti (Caraka III. viii.). 2 The details of this example are taken from Viitsyiiyana's commentary. 3 The Nyiiya sf/Ira no doubt incidentally gives a definition of jiiti as "samii1Zapra- saviitmil.'(i jatil.z ., pl. ii. 7 I).