Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/310

 294 The Nyiiya- Vaiseika Philosophy [CR. A dravya may be caused by the inhering of the effect in it, for because of its contact with another thing the effect is produced. Karma (motion) is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. Con- tact is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. A contact which inheres in the cause of the cause and thereby helps the production of the effect is also a cause. The special quality of the heat of fire is also a cause. Works according to the injunctions of the scriptures since they have no visible effect are the cause of prosperity, and because the Vedas direct them, they have validity. Philosophy in the Nyaya sutras 1. The Nyaya siltras begin with an enumeration of the sixteen subjects, viz. means of right knowledge (pramiiza), object of right knowledge (prameya), doubt (Sa1!lsaya), purpose (Prayojana), il- lustrative instances (dr!t'illta), accepted conclusions (siddhii1Zta), premisses (avayava), argumentation (tarka), ascertainment (1Zir- ?zaya), debates (-viida), disputations (jalpa), destructive criticisms (vita1}dii), faUacy (hetviibhiisa), quibble (chala), refutations (jiili), points of opponent's defeat (1Zigrahasthii1Za), and hold that by a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (lli(tsreyasa), is attained. In the second siitra it is said that salvation (apavarga) is attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge (mithyiijiliilla), defects (doa), endeavours (pravrtti), birth (jan- ma), and ultimately of sorrow. Then the means of proof are said to be of four kinds, perception (pratyaka), inference (anumii1la), analogy (upamiilla), and testimony (Sabda). Perception is defined as uncontradicted determinate knowledge unassociated with names proceeding out of sense contact with objects. Inference is of three kinds, from cause to effect (prervavat), effect to cause (Seavat), and inference from common characteristics (sii11lii1Zyato dr!a). U pamana is the knowing of anything by similarity with any well- known thing. Sabda is defined as the testimony of reliable authority (apta)2. 1 This is a hrief summary of the doctrines found in Nyiiya siitras, supplemented here and there with the views of Vatsyayana, the commentator. This follows the order of the siitras, and tries to present their ideas with as little additions from those of later day Nyaya as possible. The general treatment of N yaya- Vaise!iiika expounds the two systems in the light of later writers and commentators. 2 It is curious to notice that Vatsyayana says that an arya, a ri or a mleccha (foreigner), may be an apta (reliable authority).