Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/304

 288 The Nyiiya- Vaileika Philosophy [CH. glvmg of names to things (sa1!ijiiiikal'lIla). Because we find that the giving of names is already in usage (and not invented by US)l. On account of the fact that movements rest only in one thing, the phenomenon that a thing can enter into any un- occupied space, would not lead us to infer the existence of a:ka:sa (ether). Aka:sa has to be admitted as the hypothetical substance in which the quality of sound inheres, because, since sound (a quality) is not the characteristic of things which can be touched, there must be some substance of which it is a quality. And this substance is a:ka:sa. It is a substance and eternal like air. As being is one so a:ka:sa is one 2. In the second chapter of the second book Kal)a:da tries to prove that smell is a special characteristic of earth, heat of fire, and coldness of water. Time is defined as that which gives the notion of youth in the young, simultaneity, and quickness. I t is one like being. Time is the cause of all non-eternal things, be- cause the notion of time is absent in eternal things. Space supplies the notion that this is so far away from this or so much nearer to this. Like being it is one. One space appears to have diverse inter-space relations in connection with the motion of the sun. As a preliminary to discussing the problem whether sound is eternal or not, he discusses the notion of doubt, which arises when a thing is seen in a general way, but the particular features coming under it are not seen, either when these are only remem- bered, or when some such attribute is seen which resembles some other attribute seen before, or when a thing is seen in one way but appears in another, or when what is seen is not definitely grasped, whether rightly seen or not. He then discusses the ques- tion whether sound is eternal or non-eternal and gives his reasons to show that it is non-eternal, but concludes the discussion with a number of other reasons proving that it is eternal. The first chapter of the third book is entirely devoted to the inference of the existence of soul from the fact that there must be some substance in which knowledge produced by the contact of the senses and their object in heres. The knowledge of sense-objects (illdriyiirtlta) is the reason by 1 I have differed from Upasl.:iira in interpreting" saJ!lj;illkar11la" in II. i. 18, 19 as a genitive compound while Upaskiira makes it a dvamlva compound. Upaskiira's interpretation seems to be far-fetched. He wants to twist it into an argument for the existence of (Oll. 2 This interpretation is according to Sailkara llisra's Upasl.:iira.