Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/300

 28 4 The Nyiiya - Vaifeika Philosophy [CH. feelings of attachment to things are also generated by adr!?ta. Throughout almost the whole of VI. i Ka1)ada is busy in showing the special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A refer- ence to our chapter on Mlmarpsa will show that the later Mlmarpsa writers agreed with the N yaya- V aiseika doctrines in most of their views regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main points in which Mlmarpsa differs from N yaya- V aiseika are (I) self- validity of the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbelief in any creator or god, (4) eternality of sound (sabda), (5) (accord- ing to Kumarila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego. Of these the first and the second points do not form any subject of discussion in the Vaise!:,ika. But as no Isvara is mentioned, and as all adrta depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we may assume that Vaise!?ika had no dispute with Mlmarpsa. The fact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due to the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the Vaifeika sittras. It is probable that Ka1)ada believed that the Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i. 1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with Mlmarpsa suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never written by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in the days of the Vaife#ka sittras, the view was probably what is represented in the V aifeika siitras. As there is no reference to Isvara and as adrta proceeding out of the performance of actions in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vaiseika was as atheistic or non-theistic as the later Mlmarpsa philosophers. As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one of the main points of quarrel between the N yaya- V aiseika and the Mlmarpsa, we find that in II. ii. 25-32, Kal)ada gives reasons in favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. 33 till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the eternality of sound, which is the distinctive Mlmarpsa view as we know from the later Mlmarpsa writers 1 . Next comes the question of the proof of the existence of sel( The traditional N yaya view is 1 The last two concluding siitras II. ii. 36 and 37 are in my opinion wrongly inter- preted hy Sai1kara Misra in his Upaskiira (II. ii. 36 by adding an "api" to the sutra and therehy changing the issue, and II. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic comhination "saf!1khyiihhiiva" as saJpkhyii and hhiiva instead of SaJ11khyii and abhiiva, which in my opinion is the right comhination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound as we find in thc latcr Kyiiya-Vaise!.,iika view.