Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/297

 VIII] A lltiquity 0./ V aifeika 281 heaviness (gurutva), liquidity(dravatva), oiliness (sneha), elasticity (saJ!lskiira), merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma); in one part of the sutra the enumeration begins with "para" (universality) and ends in "prayatna: J but buddhi (cognition) comes within the enumeration beginning from para and ending in prayatna, whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the list and is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that CarakaJs siitra was written at a time when the six gUlfas left out in the V aiseika enumeration had come to be counted as gUlfas, and compendiums had been made in which these were enumerated. Bhiiiipariccheda (a later Vaiseika compendium), is a compilation from some very old karikas which are referred to by Visvanatha as being collected from "atisaJ!zk#ptaciralltaJzoktibhi!l "-(from very ancient aphorisms!); Caraka's definition of samanya and visea shows that they had not then been counted as separate categories as in later N yaya- V aiseika doctrines; but though slightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definition one finds in the Vaiseika sittra that samanya (generality) and visea are relative to each other 2. Caraka's siitras were therefore probably written at a time when the V aiseika doctrines were undergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were begin- ning to be written on them. The Vaz"se#ka siUras seem to be ignorant of the Buddhist doctrines. I n their discussions on the existence of soul, there is no reference to any view as to non-existence of soul, but the argument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be an object of inference or revealed to us by our notion of" I." There is also no other reference to any other systems except to some Mimarpsa doctrines and occasionally to Sarpkhya. There is no reason to suppose that the Mimarpsa doctrines referred to allude to the ffilimiil!lSii siitras of J aimini. The manner in which the nature of inference has been treated shows that the N yaya phraseology of "piirvavat" and "seavat" was not known. Vaise- cause 3 . We know that the Svetasvatara U paniad refers to those who regard time as the cause of all things, but in none of the 1 Professor Vanamiili Vediintatirtha's article in J. A. S. E., 1908. 2 Caraka (I. I. 33) says that siimiinya is that which produces unity and viSea is that which separates. V. S. II. ii. 7. Siimiinya and visea depend upon our mode of thinking (as united or as separate). 3 Vaifefika siUra (II. ii. 9 and v. ii. 26).
 * 1) ka siUras in more than one place refer to time as the ultimate