Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/232

 216 The Kapila and the Piitaiijala Sii1?zkhya [CH. the state of mok:;a comes about. Various kinds of moral en- deavours in the shape of association with good people, abandoning of desires, determined attempts at discovering the truth with fixed attention, are spoken of as indispensable means. Truth (tattva) thus discovered .should be recalled again and again 1 and this will ultimately effect the disunion of the body with the self. As the self is avyakta (unmanifested) and has no specific nature or character, this state can only be described as absolute cessation (1Jloke 1livTttirlli!deii). The main features of the Sarpkhya doctrine as given by Caraka are thus: I. Purua is the state of avyakta. 2. By a conglomera- of this avyakta with its later products a conglomeration is formed which generates the so-called living being. 3. The tanmatras are not mentioned. 4. Rajas and tamas represent the bad states of the mind and sattva the good ones. 5. The ultimate state of emancipation is either absolute annihilation or characterless abso- lute existence and it is spoken of as the Brahman state; there is no consciousness in this state, for consciousness is due to the con- glomeration of the self with its evolutes, buddhi, aharpkara etc. 6. The senses are formed of matter (blzautika). This account of Sarpkhya agrees with the system of Sarpkhya propounded by Pancasikha (who is said to be the direct pupil of A.suri the pupil of Kapila, the founder of the system) in the Mahabharata XII. 219. Paficasikha of course does not describe the system as elaborately as Caraka does. But even from what little he says it may be supposed that the system of Sarpkhya he sketches is the same as that of Caraka 2. Paficasikha speaks of the ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term applied in all Sarpkhya literature to prakrti) in the state of purua (puruii- vastlzamavyakta11l). If man is the product of a mere combination of the different elements, then one may assume that all ceases with death. Caraka in answer to such an objection introduces a discussion, in which he tries to establish the existence of a self as the postulate of all our duties and sense of moral responsibility. The same discussion occurs in Paficasikha also, and the proofs 1 Four causes are spoken of here as being causes of memory: (I) Thinking of the cause leads to the rememhering of the effect, (2) by similarity, (3) by opposite things, and (4) Ly acute attempt to remember. 2 Some European scholars have experienced great difficulty in accepting Pafi- casikha's doctrine as a genuine Salpkhya doctrine. This may probahly be due to the fact that the S:ilJ1khya doctrines sketched in Caraka did not attract their notice.