Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/197

 VIl Relativity of Judgn?ents 181 point of view. They do not perceive that the nature of reality is such that the truth of any assertion is merely conditional, and holds good only in certain conditions, circumstances, or senses (uPiidhi). It is thus impossible to make any affirmation, which is universally and absolutely valid. For a contrary or contradictory affirmation will always be found to hold good of any judgment in some sense or other. As all reality is partly permanent and partly exposed to change of the form of losing and gaining old and new qualities, and is thus relatively perma- nent and changeful, so all our affirmations regarding truth are also only relatively valid and invalid. Being, non-being and indefinite, the three categories of logic, are all equally available in some sense or other in all their permutations for any and every kind of judgment. There is no universal and absolute position or negation, and all judgments are valid only conditionally. The relation of the naya doctrine with the syadvada doctrine is therefore this, that for any judgment according to any and every naya there are as many alternatives as are indicated by syadvada. The validity of such a judgment is therefore only conditional. If this is borne in mind when making any judgment according to any naya, the naya is rightly used. If, however, the judgments are made ab- solutely according to any particular naya without any reference to other nayas as required by the syadvada doctrine the nayas are wrongly used as in the case of other systems, and then such judgments are false and should therefore be called false nayas (llayiibhiisa) 1. Knowledge, its value for us. The Buddhist Dharmottara in his commentary on Nyayabindu says that people who are anxious to fulfil some purpose or end in which they are interested, value the knowledge which helps them to attain that purpose. It is because knowledge is thus found to be useful and sought by men that philosophy takes upon it the task of examining the nature of true knowledge (samyagjiiii1za or pramii1Ja). The main test of true knowledge is that it helps us to attain our purpose. The J ains also are in general agreement with the above view of knowledge of the Buddhists 2. They also 1 The earliest mention of the doctrine of syadvada and saptabhmi.gi probably occurs in Bhadrabiihu's (433-357 B.C.) commentary SiUrakrtiiizganiryukti. 2 See Pra1/liia-naya-tattviilokiilal!lkiira (Benares), p. 26; also Parik!ii-11lukha- sutra-vrlti (Asiatic Society), ch. I.