Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/178

 162 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. a long time past does not prove that a permanent self has been existing for such a long period. Vhen I say this is that book, I perceive the book with my eye at the present moment, but that "this book" is the same as "that book" (i.e. the book arising in memory), cannot be perceived by the senses. It is evident that the "that book" of memory refers to a book seen in the past, whereas "this book" refers to the book which is before my eyes. The feeling of identity which is adduced to prove per- manence is thus due to a confusion between an object of memory referring to a past and different object with the object as perceived at the present moment by the senses 1. This is true not only of all recognition of identity ald permanence of external objects but also of the perception of the identity of self, for the perception of self-identity results from the confusion of certain ideas or emotions arising in memory with similar ideas of the present moment. But since memory points to an object of past perception, and the per- ception to another object of the present moment, identity cannot be proved by a confusion of the two. Every moment all objects of the world are suffering dissolution and destruction, but yet things appear to persist, and destruction cannot often be noticed. Our hair and nails grow and are cut, but yet we think that we have the same hair and nail that we had before, in place of old hairs new ones similar to them have sprung forth, and they leave the impression as if the old ones were persisting. So it is that though things are destroyed every moment, others similar to these often rise into being and are destroyed the next moment and so on, and these similar things succeeding in a series produce the impression that it is one and the same thing which has been persisting through all the passing moments 2. Just as the flame of a candle is changing every moment and yet it seems to us as if we have been perceiving the same flame all the while, so all our bodies, our ideas, emotions, etc., all external objects around us are being destroyed every moment, and new ones are being generated at every succeeding moment, but so long as the objects of the succeeding moments are similar to those of the preceding moments, it appears to us that things have remained the same and no destruction has taken place. 1 See pralyabhijfiiiniriisa of the Buddhists, jl/yiiyallla1ijari, V.S. Series, pp. 449, etc. 2 See Tmokarahasyadlpikii of GUl}aratna, p. 3 0, and also Nyayalllaiijari, V.S. edition, p. 450.