Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/173

 v] Inference 157 he tried to show that the concomitance is not between those cases which possess the liilga or reason with the cases which possess the sadhya (probandum) but between that which has the characteristics of the liilga with that which has the characteristics of the sadhya (probandum); or in other words the concomitance is not between the places containing the smoke such as kitchen, etc., and the places containing fire but between that which has the characteristic of the liilga, viz. the smoke, and that which has the characteristic of the sadhya, viz. the fire. This view of the nature of concomitance is known as inner concomitance (antarvyiiPti), whereas the former, viz. the concomitance between the thing possessing liilga and that possessing sadhya, is known as outer concomitance (bahirvyapti) and generally accepted by the Nyaya school of thought. This antarvyapti doctrine of concomitance is indeed a later Buddhist doctrine. It may not be out of place here to remark that evidences of some form of Buddhist logic probably go back at least as early as the Katlliivattlm (200 B.c.). Thus Aung on the evidence of the Yamaka points out that Buddhist logic at the time of Asoka "was conversant with the distribution of terms" and the process of conversion. He further points out that the logical premisses such as the udaharaI!a ( Yo yo aggimii so so dhitlJlava-whatever is fiery is smoky), the upanayana (ayam pabbato dlllt1Jlavii-this hill is smoky) and the niggama (tasmiidayam aggimii-therefore that is fiery) were also known. (Aung further sums up the method of the arguments which are found in the Katlliivatthu as follows: U Adherent. Is A B? (thiipa1lii). Opponent. Yes. Adherent. Is C D? (PiiPanii). Opponent. No. Adherent. But if A be B then (you should have said) Cis D. That B can be affirmed of A but D of C is false. Hence your first answer is refuted.") The antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed thapana, because the opponent's position, A is B, is conditionally established for the purpose of refutation. The consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed papana because it is got from the antecedent. And the con-