Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/168

 15 2 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. desires to have (samyagjiliinaprtrvikii sarvapurltarthasiddhl")1. When on proceeding, in accordance with the presentation of any knowledge, we get a thing as presented by it we call it right knowledge. Right knowledge is thus the knowledge by which one can practically acquire the thing he wants to acquire (arthiidhi- gati). The process of knowledge, therefore, starts with the per- ceptual presentation and ends with the attainment of the thing represented by it and the fulfilment of the practical need by it (arthiidhigamat samiiPta(l prmnii!lavyiiptira(l). Thus there are three moments in the perceptual acquirement of knowledge: (I) the presentation, (2) our prompting in accordance with it, and (3) the final realization of the object in accordance with our endeavour following the direction of knowledge. Inference is also to be called right knowledge, as it also serves our practical need by representing the presence of objects in certain connec- tions and helping us to realize them. In perception this presen- tation is direct, while in inference this is brought about indirectly through the lill.ga (reason). Knowledge is sought by men for the realization of their ends, and the subject of knowledge is dis- cussed in philosophical works only because knowledge is sought by men. Any knowledge, therefore, which will not lead us to the realization of the object represented by it could not be called right knowledge. All illusory perceptions, therefore, such as the perception of a white conch-shell as yellow or dream perceptions, are not right knowledge, since they do not lead to the realization of such objects as are presented by them. It is true no doubt that since all objects are momentary, the object which was per- ceived at the moment of perception was not the same as that which was realized at a later moment. But the series of existents which started with the first perception of a blue object finds itself realized by the realization of other existents of the same series (1liliidau ya eva santiilltl(t par£cchi1lJlO 1lilajiiiinena sa eva tena prtipita(l tOla 1lilaJiiiinam pramiitam) 2. When it is said that right knowledge is an invariable ante- cedent of the realization of any desirable thing or the retarding of any undesirable thing, it must be noted that it is not meant 1 Bricf extracts from the opinions of two other commentators of Nyii)Jabilldu, Vinitadeva and Santabhadra (seventh century), are found in Nyiiyabilldu!il.:ii{ippa1Zi, a commentary of NyiiJ'abilldu{ikii of Dharmmottara, hut their texts are not available tu us. 2 Nyiiyabilllltt{ikti{ippalli, p. I I.