Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/130

 114 Buddhist Philosophy [ CII. as expressed in the Pali works. The V aibhaikas and the Sau- trantikas have been more or less associated with each other. Thus the Abhidharmakosasiistra ofVasubandhu who was a Vaibha!?ika was commented upon by Yasomitra who was a Sautrantika. The difference between the V aibhaikas and the Sautrantikas that attracted the notice of the Hindu writers was this, that the former believed that external objects were directly perceived, whereas the latter believed that the existence of the external objects could only be inferred from our diversified knowledge 1. GUIfaratna (fourteenth century A.D.) in his commentary Tarkarahasyaaipikii on $a(ldarsanasam,ltccaya says that the V aibhaika was but another name of the A.ryasammitIya school. According to GUIfaratna the Vaibhaikas held that things existed' for jour ntS, -the moment of producfion, the mometrrof e the nTIJment of d'cray and the moment of anmfiiTation. It has b pOInted m:rr in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa that the Vaibhaikas believed these to be four kinds of forces which by coming in combination with the permanent essence of an entity produced its imperma- nent manifestations in life (see Prof Stcherbatsky's translation of Yasomitra on Abhidharmakosa karikii, V. 25). The self called pudgala also possessed those characteristics. Knowledge was formless and was produced along with its object by the very same conditions (arthasahabhiisi ekasamagryadhilla!l). The Sau- trantikas according to GUI)aratna held that there was no soul but only the five skandhas. These skandhas transmigrated. The past, the future, annihilation, dependence on cause, akasa and pudgala are but names (sa1[l}lziimiitram), mere assertions (pratijjia11liitralll), mere limitations (samvrtamiitram) and mere phenomena (vJ1a- vahiiramatram). By pudgala they meant that which other people called eternal and all-pervasive soul. External objects are never directly perceived but are only inferred as existing for explaining the diversity of knowledge. Definite cognitions are valid; all compounded things are momentary (kalika!z. sarvasa1!lskarii!l). 1 Madhavacarya's Sarvadarfa1Zasa,!lgraha, chapter II. .5astradipikii, the discussions on Pratyaka, Amalananda's commentary (on Bhiilllati) Vedlllltakalpataru, p. 286, .. vaibILd!ikas}'a biihyo'rtha!z prat)'akfafJ, sautrd1Ztikas}'a jiiiillagatiikdravaidtr}le,! allulIleJ'a!z." The nature of the inference of the Sautrantlkas is shown thus by Amala- nanda (1247-1260 A. D.) .. l'e yaslllill satyaPi kiidlldtkii!z t tadati1'iktiipek!ii!z" (those (i.e. cognitions) which in spite 01 cerlain unvaried conditions are of unaccounted di"ersity must depend on other things in addition to these, i.e. the external objects) Vedt"il1ta/alpatarZt, p. 289.