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 could not provide a uniform and sound currency, but also because they could not provide domestic exchange. The trade of Kentucky, he said, "without a Bank of the United States, is constantly, and oppressively, and unjustly burdened in both directions, towards New Orleans and towards the eastern cities. Its bills on New Orleans, of which it is generally a creditor, are usually sold at a discount of two per cent., besides interest, while remittances on the eastward, of which we are generally a debtor, command a premium of from two per cent. to three per cent. During the existence of the branches of the United States Bank they purchased generally the bills of our traders on New Orleans at from one per cent. to one and a-half per cent. discount, and supplied remittances in great abundance to any part of the United States at a premium of one-half of one per cent. The people of Kentucky have suffered constantly and severely by these operations, and have lost hundreds of thousands of dollars for the want of a Bank of the United States."

The banks of the Mississippi Valley very much preferred the exchange business to the discounting of notes. In the former they escaped the restrictions of the usury law and also the necessity of making renewals. The exchange business was therefore more profitable and more punctual.

In the Pennsylvania Legislature, in 1840, there was a strong party of radical democrats, which was greatly irritated against the banks, especially against the Bank of the United States. The latter had, therefore, great cause to apprehend adverse legislation, especially in the way of a peremptory command to resume. A committee of the directors was appointed, of which George Handy was the only active and important member, to watch legislation and take measures to defeat any which should be hostile. Handy employed one or two experienced lobbyists; but in the course of the winter and spring there were a half-dozen persons who were active at Harrisburg in the interest of the Bank and who were in the end paid by it. It was inevitable that some action would be taken, and the points which the Bank wanted to secure were that a date should be set as distant as possible for resumption, and that all the laws imposing penalties for non-redemption should be suspended until that time. It attained its objects. Two years later an investigation was made, in which all these proceedings came to light, and the correspondence of the Bank's agents with Handy, consisting of one hundred and nine letters, were published. The Investigating Committee, in their report, construed all the evidence as proving that the lobbyists had duped the Bank and extorted money from it, but had never paid anything to any member of the Legislature, and had never really influenced legislation. This theory is not adequate to the facts presented in the testimony, which presents us a shameful picture of the Bank of the United