Page:A History of Banking in the United States.djvu/218

 That letter is smooth, courteous, and plausible; but with a knowledge of the ideas and sentiments which were behind it in the administration circle, it is full of menace and deep hostility. Ingham discusses the points implied by him, but in form raised by Biddle, as if they had been brought forward by the latter. He says that if the Bank should abuse its powers, the Secretary is authorized to remove the deposits. Hence the three points which Biddle found in his former letter are good. It does not appear that Biddle, up to that time, had ever thought of this power as within the range of the discussion, or of the exercise of it as amongst the possibilities. Ingham says that there are two theories of the Bank: first, that it is exclusively for national purposes and for the common benefit of all, and that the "employment of private interest is only an incident—perhaps an evil,—founded in mere convenience for care and management." Second, that it is intended "to strengthen the arm of wealth, and counterpoise the influence of extended suffrage in the disposition of public affairs," and that the public deposits are one of its means for performing this function. He says that there are two means of resisting the latter theory: the power to remove the deposits, and the power to appoint five of the directors. He adds that if the Bank should exercise political influence, that would afford him the strongest motive for removing the deposits.

Biddle's reply of October 9th is still gay and good-natured. He recedes from the controversy, only maintaining that it is the policy of the Bank to keep out of politics. Ingham in his reminiscences of 1832 says that this letter showed a disposition to do him justice.

In Ingham's letters of July 23 and October 5 is to be found the key to the Bank war. In the first place the Bank is viewed as a political engine. The Secretary argues that the Bank cannot keep out of politics; that its officers ought to be taken from both parties; and that if it meddles with politics, he will punish it by removing the deposits. The only escape from the situation thus created is to go into politics on his side. If the Bank does not do so, it is an enemy and must be treated as such. In the second place, the most important point in the whole correspondence is Ingham's attempt to define the issue between two different theories of the political philosophy of a national bank. The second proposition which he formulated expounds the notion which the Kentucky relief men had developed about the Bank, and which they attributed to it as the theory and purpose of its existence. It was indeed ridiculous to allege that the stockholders of the Bank had subscribed $28,000,000 in order to go crusading against democracy and universal suffrage; but we must bear in mind also that there was, as there always had been, a very large party all over the Union, who believed that, as