Page:A Historic Judicial Controversy and Some Reflections (Gregory, 1913).djvu/11

Rh rejected Taney's nomination, which the President held back as long as possible; and in 1835 also rejected or ignored his nomination to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

Shortly thereafter John Marshall died; and on March 15th, 1836 Taney was appointed his successor, and, as the complexion of the Senate had changed, was duly confirmed.

Shortly prior to the Booth case Taney had written the principal opinion in the Dred Scott case. His appointment was certainly a political appointment. The decision in the Dred Scott case was obviously wrong on the merits and probably so on the technical or jurisdictional question involved; and from these circumstances Taney's fame as a judge suffered. But he was really an accomplished lawyer and an excellent, possibly a great, Judge. At the time the Booth case was decided, 1859, he was an old man, some eighty-two years of age. He died October 12th, 1864, at the age of eighty-seven.

Yet the opinion in the case under consideration shows no evidence of waning mental power. It is clear, logical and convincing. After a detailed statement of the facts, the Chief Justice points out that in one case the State Court claimed to exercise jurisdiction to supervise and annul the proceedings of a Federal Commissioner acting under national authority; and in the other, to exercise a summary jurisdiction of the same character over the judgment of a Federal District Court, adjudging a defendant guilty of an offense against the laws of the United States; and adds that the State Court also held that its decision is final and conclusive and not reviewable in the Courts of the United States.

He then remarks:

""These propositions are new in the jurisprudence of the United States, as well as of the States; and the supremacy of the State Courts over the courts of the United States, in cases arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, is now for the first time asserted and acted upon in the Supreme Court of a state.""

After further discussion, he says:

"It would seem to be hardly necessary to do more than to state the result to which these decisions of the State courts must inevitably lead. It is, of itself, a sufficient and conclusive answer; for no one will suppose that a government which has now lasted nearly seventy years, enforcing its laws by its own tribunals, and preserving the union of the states, could have lasted a single year, or fulfilled the high