Page:A Discourse of Constancy in Two Books Chiefly containing Consolations Against Publick Evils.pdf/135

114 mean God) or whatsoever pertains to him, within the compass of definite Termes: Yet according to our humane capacity; I am sensible that Providence is one thing properly, and this Fate I am speaking of is another. For I apprehend not, nor conceive of Providence any otherwise, than that it is a faculty and power in God, by which he sees, knows and governs all things; such a power (I mean) as is universal, undivided, guarded, and as Lucretius saith firmly united. But now the notion of Fate, seems rather to descend to things themselves, and in each of them to be observed: That so there may be such a digestion and explication of common Providence, as is distinct and agreeable to its parts. Providence therefore is in God, and is ascribed unto him alone: Fate is in things, and to them it is ascribed. It is possible I may seem to you to trifle, and as (one saith) to drill Millet. No Rh