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 brought to bear against attacking fighters. Day after day, weather permitting, the Eighth Air Force struck at German airfields, aircraft depots, and aircraft industry, hoping to win air superiority by bombing the Luftwaffe on the ground; in late July alone it lost 10 percent of its attacking bombers. In August it struck at ball bearing factories in Schweinfurt and the Messerschmitt aircraft factory at Regensburg while the Twelfth Air Force hit oil refineries in Ploesti, Romania, and aircraft factories in Wiener Neustadt. Eighth Air Force P-47 Thunderbolt fighters were soon outfitted with drop tanks, which extended their range and were intended to reduce losses as they escorted the bombers, but the Luftwaffe simply withheld attacking until they ran short of fuel and had to return to England.

The second week of October 1943 marked the high point in the Eighth Air Force's initial campaign. Scoring some bombing successes, General Eaker's command lost 8 percent of its bombers over Bremen, 8 percent over Anklam-Marienburg, 13 percent over Münster, and 26 percent in a return trip to Schweinfurt. The loss of over 1,000 crewmen and nearly 150 bombers forced a change in American strategy. First, Arnold ordered all long-range P-38 Lightning and P-51 Mustang groups completing training in the United States to England to provide escort for the bombers for the duration of the war. Second, he created a new strategic air force in Italy, the Fifteenth, to attack Germany from the south. Third, he revised the command structure of the strategic bombing effort, moving General Spaatz to England as head of United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF) to command the bombing campaign against Germany, assisted by Fred Anderson and Jimmy Doolittle as operational commanders and William Kepner as fighter commander. Eaker went to command the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, including the Fifteenth and Twelfth Air Forces.

Change came quickly. Kepner revised fighter tactics to include phased and relay escort to extend the range of the fighters accompanying the bombers deep into Germany, especially when P-51 groups began arriving in December 1943. Doolittle ordered Kepner to unleash his fighters, assigned not just to escort bombers, but to go out, find, and destroy Luftwaffe aircraft. Kepner told his pilots to strafe German fighters on the ground if necessary. On February 20, 1944, Spaatz and Anderson began an all-out bombing offensive against German aircraft production. Five days of bombing, nineteen thousand tons worth, impaired some production; but the key to Big Week's effectiveness was the Luftwaffe's loss of one-third of its strength through aerial combat, and the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces growth in theirs. 27