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 ClIAP. VI.]

RTEGE OF TIIICHINOPOLV

4-89

ciplined infantiy, who, being of no use except to give ;in alarm, occupied the a.d. 175: interval between the two walls ; the others, on whom the whole bm'den of the defence lay, consisted of about 600 sepoys, who were stationed at intervals on the ramparts, and 200 Europeans, of whom part kept the gates, while the rest

THE ENVtRONS Or

TRIG II IN OP OLY

to jllusU'iti; Uic lUililJiy Opci'alioii:^

of 1751,53

'■'ff ^f v" .Cot I

A, Seringli;im Pagoda. 15, Juniliaki.stna Pagoila. C, Chuckloypollam. 1), Dalaway's Choiiltry.

1, English post of two guns, 17.31, 17j'2.

2, French post of two guns, 1751, 17.')2.

3, French post of two guns to enfilade

the English post at the river side, 1751, 17u2.

4, French grand battery, 1751. 1752.

5. Covered way, thi-own up against the French grand batterj-, 17!), 1752.

The French .and I'hunda Saliib's camp from August 17.01, to .pril, 1752.

English post opposite the French Rock, 1751, 1752.

Mysore camp, December, 1752. 9, The Great Choultry, where the Eng- lish party Wiis cut off in Decem- ber, 1752.

6,

S

10, Covering ])arty to support that in

the Clii ultry, December, 1752.

11, English camp in He>t. 175:5, whilst

waiting for the reinforcement.

12, A small tjitrcncliinent for the secu-

rity of the left flank of the caroi). Septeniber, H.'i.'t.

13, English advanced guard, Sept. 1753.

14, French advanced guard, Sept. HS."?.

15, Camp of the French, Mysoreans, and

Mahrattas, in Sept. 175;i.

lay on their arms every night, ready to start on the first announcement of danger. The besiegers, who had been contented with maintaining the blockade, now began to think that they might venture on more decisive measures. Dupleix was of the same opinion, and was constantly importuning M. Brenier, who had succeeded M. Astruc in the command, to attempt an escalade. To procure the infonnation which was preN-iously desirable, he suggested the employment of a French officer of the name of De Cattans, who was to be sent into the town as if lie had deserted, and then act as a Hty. De Cattans readily undertook the degrading and jierilous office, but by overacting his part excited susjiicions which ihespj ultimately led to his detection. Captaui Dalton seized the opportunity to turn the devices of the enemy against themselves, and induced De Cattans, by the ])romise of interceding for his pardon wnth Major La^Tence, to write a letter to ]VI. Brenier, recommending an escalade at a particular spot which he pointed out. It was in fact, though it did not appear so externally, the strongest point in the city ; and any attempt to escalade it must have resulted in the repulse and

detected.

Vol. I.

62