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 Chap. I.] CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED COMPANY. 383

but the territory now cac»j[uired included the three entire towns, or rather ad. 1708. villages of Chuttanuttee, Govindpore, and Calcutta — thus giving the Company a territorial footing in Bengal similar to that previously possessed at Madi'as and Bombay. Bengal was in conset^uence again raised to the rank of an inde- pendent presidency, and Fort William, newly erected, and so called in honoiu" of the reigning English monarch, became its capital.

The United Company had thus at the very outset three distinct presidencies, Coiistituticm each governed by its own president and council, and entitled to act indepen- cunipim.v. dently of the others. Madnis was the oldest, Bombay the strongest, and Bengal commercially the most important, but no one possessed any recognized sujie- riority ; and the only controlling power which could give them unity of purpose and action centred in the court of directors, who met in Leadenhall Street. This court, as constituted by the new charter, laboured under several very obvious defects. Its members, twenty -four in number, were elected by the • general court of proprietors, composed of all who possessed at least £500 of stock. This amount gave one vote ; but, contrary to the provisions of earlier charters, no additional amount of .stock, however large, gave more votes than one. The proprietor of £500 and of £50,000 were placed on the very same footing, and, constitutionally at least, exercised tlie same degree of influence in the general management. Tlie object of this provision apparently was to counteract the tendency to monopoly, and prevent the recurrence of the abuse which had taken place at an earlier period, when a few overgrown proprietors, with Sir Josiah Child at their head, usurped a selfish and injurious ascendency. If this was the object, the means employed were not well calculated to accomplish it. Common fairness required that some proportion should have been established between the power of voting and the interest at stake ; and it is therefore not sur})rising that the larger proprietors took the remedy into their own hands, and had recom-se to the obvious but not very creditable expedient of manufacturing votes by splitting up their stock into £500 shares, and conveying them to confidential parties, who were bound to vote at their dictation. While no precaution was taken against this practice, the evils produced by it were per- mitted to assume their most aggravated form. The directors held office only for a single year ; and hence, as each annujil election came round, it was not impossible that the whole body of managers, and consequently the whole system of manajrement, would be chanfjed. The electioneering carried on under such circumstances was not onl}' unseemly but coiTupt, and the directors often owed their seats far less to their qualifications than to the superabundance of their promises. In proportion as the Company extended their operations, extensive and valuable rights of patronage were acquired : and the ajipointments which might be obtained in retiu'n for votes, induced many to purchase stock who cared little for the dividends which might be realized from it. The true interest of the Company Mas to such voters a matter of secondary moment ;