Page:A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings of Dr. Henry More.djvu/216

174 her as impenetrability and seperability of parts to the Matter; and we are not to demand the cause of the one no more then of the other.





1. That Subtilty is not inconsistent with the strongest Truth. 2. That the subordinate serviceableness of things in the world is in the things themselves, not merely in our Phansy. 3. That the difficulty of obtaining such serviceable commodities is rather an Argument for Providence then against it. 4. That Beauty is no necessary Result from the mere Motion of the Matter. 5. That it is an intellectual Object, not taken notice of by Brutes. 6. That the preying of Animals one upon another is very well confident with the Goodness of the First Cause. 7. As also the Creation of offensive Animals, there being curbs & correctives to their increase. 8. That the immediate Matter of the Fœtus is homogental. 9. That the notion of the Archei or Seminal forms is no such intricate Speculation.

E have now gone through all the Objections against the First Book of our Antidote; whereat if the more coursely complexioned, that they may still seem to have something further to object, shall scoffingly cavil, as if we had used over-much subtilty in the management of our Arguments, I can onely advertise them of this. That Subtilty is as consistent with Truth as the most grosse Theories; as is manifest in manifold Mathematical Speculations, then which there is nothing more certain nor undeniable to the reason of Man. But that the coherence of Notions that are subtile in themselves should be as easily plain and conspicuous as the broad Objects of Sense, is a very incongruous conceit, and can be the expedation of none but those that are utterly unskilfull in the nature of such like contemplations.

But the defence of our Second Book will be not onely more short, but, lesse obscure, our Arguments therefor the most part being such that even the unlearned can judge of them, and few of them but so evidently convictive that there can be nothing materiall alledged against them. But such Objections as there are I shall briefly set down and answer.

2. And the first is made against our reasoning for Providence from the excellent Usefulness of Stones, Timber, Metalls, the Magnet, &c. For those long and subordinate concatenations of instrumental serviceableness of such things, say they, is but our fancy, no designe of any First Cause. And how easy a thing is it for the wit of Man to bring things together that are of a distant nature in themselves, and to imagine many Series of means and ends in matters that have do dependence one of another but what himself makes, But I answer, that the severall Usefull dependences of sundry matters of this kind we onely find them, not make them. For whether we think of it or no, it is for example manifest that Fewell is good to continue Fire, and Fire to melt Metalls, and Metalls to make   Rh