Page:A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings of Dr. Henry More.djvu/212

170 Object does its Species through the Aire to the Eye; being that perception is by impression, and that the impression was lost in the Conarion, though retain'd in the Brain, how can the Conarion ever say that it had any such impression before? for the impression once wiped out, it is as if it never had any, and therefore can never remember that it had. Besides, the perception of this image in the Brain is as incompetible to the Conarion as the perception of any external Object, upon which we have already insisted.

4. And thirdly, For the power of free Imagination, whereby the Conarion is supposed to excogitate the several forms or shapes of things which it never saw; I enquire, whether it be the thin Membrane, or the inward and something soft and fuzzy Pulpe it contains, that raises and represents to it self these arbitrarious Figments and Chimeras; and then, what part or particle of either of them can perform these fine feats; and (what is most material) whether the representations being corporeal, there be not a necessity of the Conarion's being so affected or impressed as in external corporeal Objects: and then I demand how this passive soft substance should be able to impress or signe it self, or how one part of this body should be able to act upon another for this purpose, and there being a memory also of these figmental impressions, how they can be sealed upon the Brain the feat of Memory. For admitting the Conarion to imitate the manner of impression of outward Objects in inventing Images of her own, she then impressing these Images upon the Brain, it will be like as if we should make use of the impression of a Seal upon some hard matter to seal some softer matter with; in which case the two impressions will be notoriously different, those parts that give out in the one, in the other giving in.

5. Fourthly, As concerning Reason, besides that it is manifest in the use thereof that we comprehend at once the Images or Phantasms of not only different but contrary things in the very same part or particle of the Conarion, (for if they be in different parts, what shall judge of them both,) as when, for example, we conclude hot is not cold, or a crooked line is not a straight line, which cannot be conceived without a confusion of both impressions: there is also another consideration of Notions plainly immaterial, which do not impress themselves upon the Conarion, nor any part of the Brain, or on the outward Organs from sensible Objects, but are our own innate conceptions in the speculation of things; and such are sundry Logical, Metaphysical and Mathematical Notions, as I have elsewhere made good. Wherefore it seems altogether incredible that the Conarion, being so gross and palpable a body as it is, should have any Notions or Conceptions that are not corporeal and conveyed to it from material Objects from without.

6. But fifthly and lastly. It is very hardly conceivable how the Conarion, if it were capable of Sense and perception, should, being thus but a mere pulpous protuberant knob, by its nods or joggs drive the Animal spirits so curiously, as not to miss the key that leads to the motion of the least joynt of our body, or to drive them in so forcibly and smartly, as to enable us to strike so fierce strokes as we see men do, especially these Rh