Page:A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings of Dr. Henry More.djvu/198

156 5. For as for example, while it is confect that Matter is finite and cannot be otherwise, for a Body to be figured implies neither Perfection nor Imperfection, but is a natural and necessary affection thereof, yet to be ordinately figured, is an undoubted Perfection of a Body: so in like manner, though it were confessed that mere Existence is neither Perfection nor Imperfection, yet so noble a Mode thereof as necessarily to Exist, must without all tergiversation be acknowledged a notion of Perfection, and therefore to accrew naturally to the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect.





1. That there is a vast difference betwixt arguing from forced Figments or fancies, and from the natural Ideas of our own Minds. 2. That the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil does not imply necessary Existence, whether it signifie a Being absolutely Imperfect, 3. Or absolutely Wicked, 4. Or absolutely Miserable, 5. Or absolutely Mischievous. 6. That if by a Being absolutely Mischievous were meant onely the Infinite power of doing hurt, this is God, whose absolute Goodness prevents the execution thereof. 7. That the right Method of using our Reason is to proceed from what is plain and unsuspected to what is more obscure and suspicable. 8. That according to this Method, being assured first of the Existence of a Being absolutely Perfect from his Idea, we are therewithall inabled to return answer, that Impossibility of Existence belongs to a Being either absolutely Miserable or absolutely Mischievous. 9. That the Phænomena of the World further prove the impossibility of the Existence of a Being absolutely Mischievous. 10. And that the Counsels and Works of God are not to be measured by the vain Opinions of Men.

S for those that admit necessary Existence to be included in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect, but would shew that our Inference from thence, viz. That this perfect Being doth Exist, is false and sophistical, because necessary Existence is contained in the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil, which notwithstanding we will not admit to Exist (for, say they, that which is absolutely Evil is immutably and ever unavoidably such, and cannot but be so, and therefore it cannot but Exist, and ever has Existed:) To these we answer, That we shall easily discover the grand difference betwixt such arbitrarious and forced Figments and fancies as these, and the naturall and consistent Ideas of our own Mind, if we look more carefully and curiously into the Nature of what these Objectors have ventured to utter, and sift out what either themselves mean, or what must necessarily be understood by this Idea of a Being absolutely Evil; which they have thus forged.

2. By the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil must be meant either the Idea of a Being absolutely Imperfect, or absolutely Wicked, or absolutely Miserable, or absolutely Mischievous.

Now the Idea of what is absolutely Imperfect removes from it  Rh